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THE MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRIC
COMPANY'S EXEMPTION FROM UTILITY
COMMISSION REGULATION: THE
CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE
While privately owned utilities are regulated in every state, municpally owned
utilities are usually exempt from state supervision. Exemption is supported by the
belief that government ownershp effectively substitutes/or regulation, and that local
control is more sensitive to local needs. Critics assert, however, that self-regulation
breeds inefficiency, that compliance with self-imposed service standards is unrealistic,
and that local control is too susceptible to localpoliticalpressures. This Note exam-
ines the regulatory discrepancy between privately and municioally owned utilities,
and assesses the impact of that discrepancy on residential electric consumers. It con-
cludes that the procedural inadequacies, political disruption, and inefficiency which
characterize the operation ofsel-regulated utilities can be eliminated byplacing mu-
nicipally owned electric utilities under state commission jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
MOST ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS in the United States en-
joy uniform, adequate service, ensured by state regulation of
privately owned utilities.1 Municipally owned utilities, however,
are usually exempt from regulation.2 Many cities are becoming or
considering becoming producers of electricity to generate income
and reduce operating costs.' These advantages of municipal own-
ership, coupled with recent economic hardship suffered by inves-
tor-owned utilities,4 will likely increase the number of municipal
1. See Comment, Rates Follow Service: The Power of the Public Utility Commission
to Regulate Quality of Service, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 1137, 1146 (1976).
2. See id. (generally describing utility commission jurisdiction state by state); see also
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1979 ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT]
(listing 27 municipal utilities within state regulatory jurisdiction); cf. Osteryoung &
Bilenky, The Cost ofRetained Earningsfor Government Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
July 30, 1981, at 44 (29 states regulate government-owned utilities). Few states hold munic-
ipal utilities to the same standards as private utilities. See infra notes 133-61 and accompa-
nying text. Arkansas, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming regulate municipal electric utility
rates only for service offered several miles beyond the municipality's corporate boundaries.
1979 REPORT, supra, at 400.
3. Neuberg, Two Issues in the Municipal Ownership ofElectric Power Distribution Sys-
tems, 8 BELL J. ECON. 303, 303 (1977). Cities such as Berkeley, California; Boulder, Colo-
rado; Madison, Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon; and Massena and Schenectady, New York,
recently have considered municipalization for the first time since the 1930's. Id.
4. See, e.g., Christy & Christy, Who Says Utilities are Less Risky?, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
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electric companies. This development in the electric utility indus-
try, as well as phenomena such as energy shortages,5 inflation,6
increased public involvement,7 and the environmental move-
ment,8 call for reevaluating the special treatment given publicly
owned utilities.
Historically, municipally operated electric companies were ex-
empt from state regulation.9 Recently, however, states have been
bringing municipal utilities under supervision, although many still
provide varying degrees of immunity. 10 This Note analyzes how
differences in state regulatory treatment of privately and munici-
pally owned utilities affect residential electric consumers.
One justification for exempting municipal utilities from regu-
May 8, 1981, at 11; Cohen, The Changing Nature of Utility Business Management, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1981, at 38; Curtis, Electric Utilities, FoRBEs, Jan. 4, 1982, at 104;
Hitch, Utilities in Trouble, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 4, 1982, at 18; Matthews, Cushioning
"Future Shock" by Amending the Utility Mortgage, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 21, 1982, at 50.
5. See Thompson, Preparingfor the Future in Electric Power, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Apr.
12, 1979, at 19, 19-20.
6. LeafferAutomatic FuelAdjstment Clauses: Timefor a Hearing, 30 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 228, 228 (1980). From 1973 to 1974, the cost of fuel for electric utilities doubled.
Rising fuel costs, tougher safety standards, the OPEC cartel, increased consumer demand,
and pollution controls have all contributed to inflated operating costs. Controversy over
rate regulation has often kept investor-owned utilities from offsetting these increased costs.
Id. See generally Swindler, The Elements of a Sound National Energy Policy, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 3, 1980, at 13; Uhler & Zycher, Energy Forecasting and Its Uncertainties, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Jan. 17, 1980, at 27.
7. See Alpert, Consumer Advisory Boards and Investor-Owned Utilities: Rhetoric and
Reality, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 27, 1981, at 19. Since 1971, citizen participation, con-
sumer involvement, and community control have influenced federal legislation, public pol-
icy, and utility management. Some electric utilities are involving consumers in utility
management as a result of consumer and regulatory commission pressure to keep rates low
despite increasing financing and construction costs. Id. at 19; see infra notes 45-58 and
accompanying text.
8. See generaly Environmental Symposium, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 22, 1978 (articles
addressing the accommodation of environmental concerns by energy utilities).
9. See Birmingham Elec. Co. v. City of Bessemer, 237 Ala. 240, 186 So. 569 (1939),
which stated, in comparing the policies for and against exempting municipal electric
companies:
[There is clearly a sound basis for classification, to include the one [investor-
owned utilities] and exclude the other [municipally owned utilities] from the exer-
cise of such power. The defendant municipality, by its nature and elements, is a
non-profit producing governmental agency, and engages in proprietary enter-
prises for the purposes of serving its own inhabitants.
Id. at 244, 186 So. at 572. This conclusion is a representative justification for exempting
city-owned electric companies. See infra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
10. The first three states to regulate electric utilities, New York, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin, have given their regulatory agencies authority over municipal producers of
electricity, while the newest states to regulate electric utilities, Minnesota and Texas, give
the authority to the municipalities. For a comparison of various types of state regulation,
see infra notes 133-61 and accompanying text.
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lation is that local interests are better served when city-owned
companies are administered without interference from state regu-
latory agencies." Municipal utilities are frequently nonprofit,
charging lower rates than investor-owned producers. Arguably,
the increased costs and needless interference caused by state regu-
lation make such supervision undesirable. 2
Commentators have frequently asserted that self-regulation of
electricity production encourages inefficient operation, 13 and that
the absence of outside supervision permits utilities to ignore exter-
nalities which are properly part of their production Costs.' 4 Al-
lowing utilities to police themselves for compliance with service
standards has also been attacked as unrealistic. 5 Customers of
municipal utilities must frequently tolerate a standard of service
inferior to that enjoyed by others in the same state, 16 and must
11. Telly & Grove, The Municipal Utility and the Liberal Economic Ethic, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 267, 268 (1980). Defenders of municipal self-determination maintain that "a
sound basis for preserving and encouraging freedom and independence of municipal utility
operation" is retaining the democratic "grass roots" of home rule. Id. at 290; see infra
notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
12. Lower utility rates charged by nonprofit electric producers are largely attributable
to special tax treatment and different accounting methods which are unavailable to private
electric suppliers. See, e.g., Public Power Costs Less, 14 PUB. POWER (May-June 1981).
13. See, e.g., Hamilton, Foreword to Public Utility Law Symposium, 30 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 215, 223 (1980); Jarrell, The Demandfor State Regulation of the Utility Industry, 21
J.L. & ECON. 269, 269 (1979); Note, Current Iowa Public Utility Regulation, 51 IowA L.
REV. 385, 387 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Iowa Note]; infra notes 192-217 and accompany-
ing text. But see Neuberg, supra note 3, at 303.
14. See Samuels, Externalities, Rate Structure, and the Theory ofPublic Utility Regula-
tion, in ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 357 (H. Trebing ed. 1971).
[E]xternality. . . refers to situations in which one economic actor imposes costs
and/or confers benefits upon another without the former including those costs
and/or benefits in his cost and benefit (revenue) or operating calculations. In
short, the former economic actor is able to operate without bearing all the costs
which he creates and/or without accruing to himself all the benefits which he
creates.
Id. at 358; see also A. CARRON & P. MAcAVOY, THE DECLINE OF SERVICE IN THE REGU-
LATED INDUSTRIES (1981).
15. See PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, BUREAU OF CONSUMER
SERVICES, COMPLIANCE REPORT (1980) [hereinafter cited as PENNSYLVANIA REPORT] (on
file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review) (discussing electric companies' problems
with customer service regulations); infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
16. In Ohio, for example, utilities "owned and operated by any municipal corpora-
tion" are explicitly excluded from the service standards required of privately owned utili-
ties. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.02 (Page 1977 & Supp. 1981). OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 743.26 (Page 1977) delegates service and rate regulation to local government. Indiana
follows a typical approach to exemption, mandating that "[elvery public utility is required
to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities," IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-4 (Bums
1973), while explicitly excluding municipally operated utilities from the definition of regu-
lated public utilities. Id. § 8-1-2-1.
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also be subject to the capriciousness of local politics.17
Comparing the characteristics of privately and municipally
owned utilities is inherently difficult because of differences in tax
treatment, accounting methods, financing options, and philosophi-
cal perspectives."8 However, comparing the two types of utilities
as to their impact on customers is possible by contrasting manage-
rial technique, service, and regulatory standards.
This Note reviews the history and policies behind the treat-
ment of municipal utilities, 9 federal supervision of utilities in
general, 20 and the impact of the consumer movement in the utility
area.2 1 It next compares the different types and degrees of state
regulation 22 and analyzes the problems created by municipal ex-
emption.2 3 The Note concludes that the traditional policies sup-
porting regulation to ensure "adequate service at reasonable
rates" 25 outweigh those supporting exemption of nonprofit utili-
17. Some "inherent inadequacies" of local municipal utilities include a lack of experts
and investigative powers, an inability to respond to changes in technology, and a preoccu-
pation with vote-getting that compromises sound policy-making. See Blair, The Politics of
Government Pricing: Political Influences on the Rate Structures of Publicy Owned Electric
Utilities, 35 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 31, 35 (1976) (concluding that "[r]ecent studies of the
behavior of government enterprise suggest that political forces are important to under-
standing [municipal utilities'] pricing policies. The empirical results support the hypothesis
that the rate pattern can be viewed as the result of differential political influence among
consumer groups."). This suggests that many states regulate city electric service outside of
city voting limits to ensure that municipal utilities do not discriminate against consumers
without political power. Services and pricing, however, can be compromised by such polit-
ical decisions as lowering taxes or encouraging different classes of new customers, thus
forcing existing customers to subsidize local politics. Moreover, municipal consumers
might suffer from inner-city departmental politics or neglect of the system, absent regula-
tion to ensure that minimum state standards are met. See Iowa Note, supra note 13, at
388-89; infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
18. Letter from Charles E. Teclaw, Manager, Policy Analysis and Research Division,
Illinois Commerce Commission (November 10, 1981) (on file with the Case Western Re-
serve Law Review). What Mr. Teclaw referred to as "insurmountable difficulties in data
comparability" have resulted rarely, since only the Vermont Public Service Board and the
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin have undertaken to compare the service, manage-
rial, and efficiency performances of private and municipal utilities.
19. See infra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 59-132 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 133-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 162-217 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
25. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 3 (1969). "The basic
purpose of public utility regulation is 'to assure the furnishing of adequate service to all
public utility patrons, without discrimination and at the lowest reasonable rates consistent
with the interests both of the public and the utilities."' Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ties, 26 and that states could regulate municipal utilities and avoid
the problems associated with private utility regulation.27
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The electric utility industry has been regulated since its incep-
tion in 1879.28 Local governments granted franchises to early
companies. Although franchises were originally granted to com-
peting producers, most markets were eventually monopolized or
dominated by large companies.29  As local governments lost the
ability to control the developing natural monopolies and prevent
inefficient duplication of facilities, many state governments as-
sumed the task of supervising the rates and services of privately
owned utilities. °
A. History and Background of Regulation
In most states, the commissions which now regulate utility
companies originally monitored railroads and canals. 3 1 Early
electric companies generally were bound only by city franchises
until 1907, when New York and Wisconsin became the first states
to regulate electric utilities effectively.32 By 1910, six states regu-
26. See infra notes 162-217 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
28. Jarrell, supra note 13, at 270.
29. Note, Regulation, Competition, and Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L.
REv. 785, 787-88 [hereinafter cited as Utah Note]. This Note traces the evolution of the
municipal electric market. "Electricity's first commercial use was for limited street lighting
in large metropolitan areas. Rather than creating a single electric company, most city gov-
ernments, in order to stimulate competitive prices, granted licenses to many different com-
panies." Id. at 787. The inefficiency that resulted from duplication of generating and
transmitting facilities eliminated the competitive market. "Thus, because 'the invisible
hand of competition was powerless to check the tendency for economies of scale to lead to
monopoly,' the electric power industry went though a period of consolidation and merger."
Id.
30. Jarrell, supra note 13, at 270-71; see also Utah Note, supra note 29, at 787.
31. Minnesota, for example, created the Department of Public Service to replace some
of the functions of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, which was renamed the
"public utilities commission" in 1980. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216A.01 (West Supp.
1983). In New York, gas and electric companies are still regulated in part as "Transporta-
tion Corporations." See N.Y. TRANSP. CoRP. LAW §§ 10-17 (McKinney 1943 & Supp.
1982).
32. Jarrell, supra note 13, at 270; Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
The Case ofElectricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1962). In New York, powers of electric com-
panies are defined at N.Y. TRANSP. CoiP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1943 & Supp. 1982), stan-
dards for municipal electric utilities are found at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 360-66
(McKinney 1974), and Department of Public Service jurisdiction is specified at N.Y. PuB.
SERV. LAW § 66 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1982). The regulatory authority of the Wiscon-
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lated private utilities; by 1917, thirty-five states had electric utility
commissions.33 Currently, all states have commmissions regulat-
ing privately owned electric utilities, 4 yet the degree to which
states control municipal electric utilities varies."5
Municipal electric plants were operating as early as 1881,36
usually for street lighting.37 Between 1892 and 1921 the number of
municipal electric companies increased more than tenfold. 31 Since
most of the systems were relatively small, 39 many were sold to
growing privately owned companies in the 1920's.40 Despite a de-
cline of municipal ownership in the late 1920's, factors such as tax
advantages, the eminent domain power, lower possible rates, and
public demand for utility reform rejuvenated the popularity of
municipal ownership during the 1930's.41
Today, 2200 municipally owned electric companies serve 30
million customers, usually in cities with populations of 10,000 or
less.42 According to the American Public Power Association, mu-
nicipal utilities serve 13.7 percent of the population, while inves-
tor-owned utilities serve 76.1 percent and rural electric
sin Public Service Commission is set forth at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.01-.97 (jurisdiction
over privately and municipally owned electric utilities); 197.01-.20 (acquisition of utilities);
and 198.01-.22 (municipal power districts) (West 1957 & Supp. 1981).
33. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 32, at 4.
34. Before 1969, only Texas, Minnesota, and South Dakota did not regulate electric
utility service. I A. PRIEST, supra note 25, at 2. These states subjected privately owned
electric companies to state commission jurisdiction in 1975. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 49-34A-5 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.01 (West Supp. 1983); TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 2 (Vernon 1980).
35. See infra notes 133-61 and accompanying text.
36. A. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 575 (1969).
37. M. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 447 (1957).
38. Id. (the number increased from 235 to 2,581); see also A. PHILLIPS, supra note 36,
at 575.
39. Municipal electric plants were established because smaller markets were not likely
to yield profits needed to attract commercial producers. M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at
447. Although municipal suppliers accounted for 41% of all electric systems in 1921, they
produced only 4.7% of the nation's total output of electric power. A. PHILLIPS, supra note
36, at 575.
40. A. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 575. Construction of transmission lines which al-
lowed connection of small communities to distant power sources subsequently led to pri-
vate ownership of the utilities dependent on privately generated electricity. M. GLAESER,
supra note 37, at 447.
41. M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at 447; A. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 575. For a
typical statutory provision authorizing eminent domain acquisitions, see MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 164, § 35 (West 1976) (most recently amended in 1914); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.065
(West 1965 & Supp. 1982).
42. AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, THE PUBLIC BENEFITS OF PUBLIC
POWER 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER] (available upon request
from the American Public Power Association).
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cooperatives 10.2 percent.43 In many states, municipally owned
utilities and rural electric cooperatives are outside the jurisdiction
of agencies which regulate privately owned companies.44
B. The Consumer Movement
Until the late 1960's and early 1970's, consumer participation
in rate hearings and drafting of electric utility regulations was
rare.45 In the late 1960's consumer activism, disenchantment with
government, and environmental concerns combined to establish
the consumer as a potent participant in utility lawmaking and
hearings.46 As organized consumer action affected local and fed-
eral legislation, the industry created consumer advisory boards
which directly involve customers in utility activities.4 7
Three devices now permit previously excluded consumers to
participate in administrative hearings: use of a branch of the state
government as a "peoples advocate," individual consumer group
intervention at hearings, and the industry's own consumer advi-
sory boards.48 The Ohio legislature, for example, created a Con-
sumers' Counsel within the Public Utilities Commission to
represent residential consumers,49 and municipal corporations in
43. Id. at 6; cf. Utah Note, supra note 29, at 788 (private companies supply 77.7% of
national output).
44. For a discussion of state commission jurisdiction over municipal utilities, see infra
notes 134-61 and accompanying text. Rural electric cooperatives are excluded from state
commission jurisdiction in some states because they are perceived to be "effectively regu-
lated and controlled" by statutes governing cooperative associations, see, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 216B.01 (West Supp. 1983); other states treat rural electric cooperatives under a
separate legislative code, with substantially the same result, see, e.g., N.Y. RURAL ELEC.
Coop. LAW §§ 1-70 (McKinney 1948 & Supp. 1982). A few states, notably New Mexico
and Wyoming, include rural electric cooperatives under state utility commission jurisdic-
tion. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 37-2-205 (1971). The New
Mexico provision stresses the importance of protecting "the interests of consumers" and
preventing "unnecessary duplication." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978).
Rural cooperatives affect a proportionately small segment of the population, although
signs of increasing demand and production may indicate the need for further study of this
type of electric producer. Energy Input by Rural Electric Systems Continues to Climb, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Feb. 17, 1977, at 20.
45. Cf. Rosenberg, Rates, Consumer Pressure and Finance, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 31,
1974, at 28 (calling for "innovative, aggressive and fair" representation of the public inter-
est by state regulatory commissions).
46. Alpert, supra note 7, at 19.
47. Id.
48. Kens, Public Futility-The Status of Consumers in Light of the Public Utility Regu-
latoryAct, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 953, 954 (1976).
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4911.01-.18 (Page 1977 & Supp. 1983). The Consum-
ers' Counsel Board can only intervene in cases within the Ohio Public Utilities Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, and not in proceedings of municipally owned utilities. To encourage
[Vol. 33:294
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Ohio may intervene on behalf of their residents in state regulatory
proceedings."0 Pennsylvania protects consumers through a subdi-
vision of its utility commission,5" while Wisconsin has an in-
dependent commission with the exclusive function of representing
electricity consumers.5 2 In Minnesota, consumer interests are rep-
resented by a division of the Department of Commerce.5 3 Con-
gress has also acted to assure consumer participation in state
hearings. Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA)54 encourages special interest groups to intervene
as interested parties,5 5 and requires the utility to reimburse inter-
vening groups for legal fees and expenses when their intervention
affects the final decision.5 6
The consumer advisory boards established by utility compa-
consumer interaction, the Consumers' Council Board maintains a toll-free number for
Ohio utility consumers: 1-800-282-9448. Id. at § 4911.01(A).
50. Id § 4911.15 (Page Supp. 1983).
51. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308(d) (Purdon 1979) defines the Bureau of Consumer
Services, a subdivision of the Public Utilities Commission.
52. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 199.01 (West Supp. 1981). The purpose of the Wisconsin Citi-
zen Utility Board is to "ensur[e] effective and democratic representation of individual
farmers and other individual residential utility consumers before regulatory agencies, the
legislature and other public bodies and [to provide] for consumer education on utility serv-
ice costs and on benefits and methods of energy conservation." Id § 199.02.
53. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 45.17 (West Supp. 1981) ensures consumer representation in
proceedings of publicly and privately owned utilities.
54. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-45 (Supp. V
1981)).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 2631 (Supp. V 1981). See also Re Public Serv. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 351, 354 (N.H. P.U.C. 1979) (an intervenor is a "party" if it has "sufficiently
notilied] the commission of the desire to actively participate or to state why its interests are
affected by the overall proceeding, or that its interests were necessary for a fair evaluation
of the issues and that their interests were not represented by other parties to the proceed-
ing."); cf. Office of Consumers' Council v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 56 Ohio St. 2d 220,
383 N.E.2d 593 (1978) (failure of adequate notice to intervene). But see Vermont Pub.
Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 39 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 59, 64 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1980) (commission has duty to hear any claims of unlaw-
ful acts by utility); American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Util., 379 Mass. 498,
399 N.E.2d 1 (1980) (industrial customer with standing to appeal as aggrieved party af-
fected by discriminatory rates).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (Supp. V 1981). Costs are not reimbursed unless intervention
substantially contributes to the commission's decision and "persons with the same or simi-
lar interests have a common legal representative." Id.; see Re Costs of Participation in Elec.
Rate Making Proceedings, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 259, 273 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1980); Re Minnesota Power and Light Co., 41 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 554, 616-17
(Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1981) (senior citizen coalition reimbursed although state also
intervened on behalf of consumers). But see Re Proceedings to Consider Elec. Rate Mak-
ing Standards, 35 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980) (com-
mission without authority to award intervenors' expenses).
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nies provide a third forum for consumer participation. 7 Some
electric companies invite participation by consumer advisory
boards "as a means of keeping in touch with customers, finding
out what they want, softening their attitude toward 'the electric
company,"' and "providing [the] participation organized con-
sumerism claims it wants."58 But the effectiveness of this forum is
limited by the number of companies that decline to initiate such
boards.
II. APPROACHES TO THE DUTY TO RENDER
ADEQUATE SERVICE
Before the days of electricity, Justice Stone, writing for the
Supreme Court, stated, "The primary duty of a public utility is to
serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the service it ren-
ders."59 This obligation applies to both private and municipal
utilities. Regardless of statutory requirements, utilities must com-
ply with federal due process requirements. While termination of
service by a state-regulated private utility is not considered "state
action,"6 in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft6 the
Supreme Court held that termination of utility service without ad-
equate notice "deprive[s the customer] of an interest in property
without due process of law."62
Prior to the consumer movement, commentators paid little at-
tention to the utility's duty to render adequate service; instead
their commentaries focused on rates, valuation of assets, and
financing.6" Recently, increased public awareness has forced util-
57. See generally Alpert, supra note 7, at 19. But see Supportfor Consumer Advisory
Boards, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 3, 1981, at 65 (representatives of utilities with consumer
advisory boards respond to Alpert's views).
58. Alpert, supra note 7, at 20.
59. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1928).
60. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
61. 436 U.S. 1 (1978); see infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
62. 436 U.S. at 22.
63. See Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and
Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 312 (1962). The author noted:
Despite the frequent instances in everyone's life of dissatisfaction with the
quality of utility service and the constantly reported complaints of some utilities
that they can not afford to fulfill their service obligations, the literature in the field
of public utility regulation is singularly devoid of discussion of the extent of a
utility's duty to render adequate service.
Id.; cf. Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services/or
Nonpayment, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1477 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note] (written
before the appeal of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. to the United States Supreme
Court). The author concluded that although increased protection of consumer rights raises
Vol. 33:294
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ity companies and legislatures to address adequacy of service,64
although commentators have yet to examine this issue. Industry
journals, for example, discuss service not in terms of consumer
rights but in terms of its cost or impact on the utility.65 Many
consumers have only vague notions of their rights as utility cus-
tomers. Their uncertainty is compounded by the differing treat-
ment of private and municipal utilities within the same state.
Although some organizations have worked to inform consumers
of their rights as utility customers,66 many consumers rely solely
on information provided by the utility in its billing notices.
The quality of utility service improved from 1958 to 1965,
largely in response to low inflation and expansion of the gross na-
tional product.67 (When inflation is low, investment is strong and
demand rises.) While the cost of improvement added to the util-
ity's expenses, 68 as long as rate increases were granted which re-
flected these costs, the utility had no difficulty maintaining
adequate service levels.69 These conditions prevailed in the elec-
tric utility market in the early 1960's. When inflation is high, how-
ever, growth declines, rates do not offset costs, and the quality of
service inevitably deteriorates.7 0 These conditions have character-
ized the utility market of the 1970's and early 1980's.71 Economic
recession lowered expected revenues by decreasing demand for
service, and inflation eroded the utility's resources, curtailing its
ability to offset costs. These conditions were exacerbated by "regu-
latory lag"--the inability of ratemaking procedures to keep pace
with the utility's financial needs-which prevents the utility from
recouping its operating costs before inflation further erodes its
assets.72
the utility's expenses, "such expense. . . is not an exhorbitant price to pay for fairness in
the distribution of essential services . I..." Id. at 1504.
64. See, e.g., Efficiency of Service and Rate Increases, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 24, 1973,
at 50.
65. See, eg., Alpert, supra note 7, at 19; Flax, Wil the Utility Service Obligation Be-
come a Victim of Economic Theory?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., March 27, 1980, at 21.
66. For example, the Duluth (Minn.) Community Action Program sponsored the writ-
ing of a booklet discussing utility customers' rights. See LEGAL AID SERVICE OF NORTH-
EASTERN MINNESOTA, My RiGHTS Wr UTILMES COMPANIES (1981) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Law Review).
67. A. CARRON & P. MACAVoy, supra note 14, at 15-32.
68. See Flax, supra note 65, at 21; Harvard Note, supra note 63, at 1404.
69. A. CARRON & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 14, at 9-10.
70. Id. at 11-13.
71. Id. at 13.
72. See Grigg, Regulatory Lag Currently, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 23, 1977, at 13.
"Regulatory lag here refers to delays imposed, due to the legal requirements of regulatory
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Economic conditions are as germane to municipally owned
utilities as they are to privately held companies. Although many
municipal utilities have been relatively immune to these forces
due to their freedom from state ratemaking procedures, in periods
of extreme inflation even tax-exempt municipal bonds issued to
finance city-owned utilities lose their investment appeal. When
revenue sources dry up, municipal utility service quality declines.
This potential for harm to customer service is compounded in
many states by the grant of immunity from regulatory commission
minimum service requirements.7 3 Before the extent of this prob-
lem can be identified, relevant federal standards must be ascer-
tained and compared with typical state standards and policies.
A. Federal Treatment
Congress and the Supreme Court have limited their involve-
ment in utility service to defining minimum standards. The
Supreme Court has restricted its consideration to whether termi-
nation of service violated constitutionally protected property in-
terests.74 PURPA75 is the first and only federal statute to address
residential utility service. Thus, both Congress and the Court
have left much of the responsibility for utility regulation to state
legislatures, which must conform to the minimum guidelines es-
tablished by the Court. PURPA's voluntary guidelines apply only
to large electric suppliers, both municipal and investor-owned,
and offer a prototype for state legislation consistent with federal
energy policy.
1. Constitutional Protections
The first Supreme Court case supporting state regulation of
public utility companies was decided in 1876. In Munn v. Illi-
nois76 the Court held that because certain companies are "affected
with a public interest, ' 77 state regulation does not deprive them of
property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 78 The Court
proceedings, upon utility efforts to make rates and revenues track significant cost changes."
Id.
73. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 76-116 and accompanying text.
75. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 26, 30,
42, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
76. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). The Court also held that the states may exercise their police
powers over businesses operating within their boundaries.
77. Id. at 130.
78. Id. at 125; see generally I A. PRIEST, supra note 25, at 5-9.
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reasoned that when one devotes property to a purpose involving a
public interest,7 9 he, in effect, grants the power to regulate that
property for the common good, at least to the extent of the public
interest involved. 0  Munn preserved the states' right to license
public utilities through certificates of convenience and necessity8'
issued by state commissions.82 Since the state did not use the cer-
tificates to grant a public interest, but merely to declare the prop-
erty owners' obligations should the property be used for the public
benefit, no deprivation of property occurred under the fourteenth
amendment. 81 In 1952 the Court held in FCC v. RCA Communi-
cations14 that the national policy favoring competition does not
outweigh the necessity of regulating utilities.85 The Court stressed
that the function of regulation is to protect the public interest and
prevent needless duplication of facilities.8 6 The right of the con-
sumer to receive electric service was not addressed by the
Supreme Court until 1978 in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division
v. Craft.87
79. "Property does become clothed in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large." 94 U.S. at 126.
80. Id.
81. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974). In Modem
Motor Express v. Public Utility Comm'n, 154 Ohio St. 271, 95 N.E.2d 764 (1950), the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the Public Utilities Commission was authorized to license pri-
vately owned utilities by granting certificates of public convenience and necessity. The
court noted:
It is a fundamental principle that in the matter of the regulation of. . . [utili-
ties and common] carriers the purpose of. . . legislation is to secure to the public
necessary and convenient common carrier [or utility] service. . . , but not to sur-
render any of the rights of the public. . . ; and that such certificates are issued for
the benefit of the public rather than for the benefit of the recipients of the
certificates.
Id. at 275, 95 N.E.2d at 767; accord Adams v. Public Utility Comm'n, 141 Ohio St. 255,
258, 47 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1943). Nevertheless, municipal utilities escape the licensing re-
quirement in states that exempt them from commission jurisdiction, which is a prerequisite
to granting certificates. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
82. 94 U.S. 113passim (1876).
83. Id.
84. 346 U.S. 86 (1952).
85. Id. at 89-96. However, the Court has required certain state-authorized conduct by
private utilities to yield to the national policy favoring competition. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (overall state regulation of utility rates does not permit
private utility to engage in tying arrangement which violates antitrust laws); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (private utility's refusal to transport power
to municipal systems violated federal antitrust law, although refusal authorized by state
agency).
86. 346 U.S. at 92-93.
87. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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a. Memphis Light
In Memphis Light the Court held that termination of utility
service without adequate notice deprived customers of a protected
property interest in violation of the fourteenth amendment.88 The
Memphis Court found that interests as essential as utility services
reach "the stature of 'property' and "rise to the level of a 'legiti-
mate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process
Clause."89 In Memphis, a municipal utility9 ° terminated service to
a residential customer due to an error in billing records.9 In de-
ciding against the utility, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit had noted that the due process clause requires "(i) notice
informing the customer not only of the possibility of termination
but also of a procedure for challenging the disputed bill,. . . and
(ii) '[an] established [procedure] for resolution of disputes' or some
specified avenue of relief for customers who 'dispute the existence
of liability."' 92 Since individuals had a "property interest" in the
utility service, albeit an interest not necessarily involving undis-
puted ownership, termination must comply with the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.93 The Supreme
Court found that the termination violated due process because the
utility's nominal pretermination notice practices were not reason-
ably calculated to'inform customers of available administrative
remedies.94
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court noted that neither in-
junctions nor actions subsequent to termination or payment effec-
tively substitute for pretermination review.95 While an injunction
might eventually restore service to the customer, it could result in
a "uniquely final deprivation" of an essential service in the in-
88. Id. at 7-16.
89. Id. at 9. The Court found added support for this conclusion in state regulations
allowing public utility customers to enjoin a wrongful threat to terminate service or to
bring a wrongful termination action. Id. at 11. The Court believed such regulation evi-
denced the states' recognition of utility service as a protected property interest. Id.
90. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division (MLG&W) is a division of the city of
Memphis which provides utility service. It is directed by a Board of Commission-
ers appointed by the City Council, and is subject to the ultimate control of the
municipal government. As a municipal utility, MLG&W enjoys a statutory ex-
emption from regulation by the state public service commission.
Id. at 3-4.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 12 (quoting Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684 (6th
Cir. 1976)) (bracketed material by the Court).
93. Id. at 11-12.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 19.
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terim.96 Justice Marshall expressed this concern: "Utility service
is a necessity of modern life. . . .The risk of an erroneous depri-
vation, given the necessary reliance on computers, is not
insubstantial." 97
The minimum procedural guarantees required by Memphis
Light are especially important to customers of municipal utilities
which, like the Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, are often
exempt from state regulation.9" While the Memphis Light Court
held only that the utility's unsupervised compliance with its own
standards failed to ensure minimum constitutionally required pro-
tections, state regulation of municpal utilities may be necessary to
bring them in line with the fourteenth amendment.
b. Due Process vs. Equal Protection
Under a different analysis, courts have examined utility service
as a constitutionally protected legitimate claim of entitlement
rather than as a fundamental property right.99 Claims of entitle-
ment have been based on the nature of the service rendered, the
dependence of the consumer, and the availability of alterna-
tives.1°° Although this protection does not extend to all utility
service, once the benefit of service is offered by the municipality, it
becomes an entitlement.' 0 '
Procedural protections based on entitlements to continued
utility service have been defined by the courts under both due pro-
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 18. Citations by the Court include Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1974), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 106-10.
98. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
99. "[T]he importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether
it must be regarded as fundamental" for equal protection purposes. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973). For a discussion of the distinction be-
tween a fundamental right and an entitlement, see Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Comm'n,
421 F. Supp. 806, 815-16 (E.D. Pa. 1976); accord, Koger v. Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375,
1383-87 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aFdmem. 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977) (if municipal utility is sole
supplier, user has legitimate claim of entitlement to continued use); cf. Memphis Light, 436
U.S. at 9-12 (entitlement based on state statutory requirement not to terminate at will). But
see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (water is the only utility
service that is fundamental, i.e., essential to life).
100. See supra note 99.
101. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (no fundamental right to education but
once offered by state, continued benefit becomes entitlement); Koger v. Guarino, 412 F.
Supp. 1375, 1383-87 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afdmem., 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977) (once munici-
pality establishes water system, user has legitimate claim of entitlement); see also Bradford
v. Edelstein, 467 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-69 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (electricity and water); Donnelly
v. City of Eureka, 399 F. Supp. 64,67-68 (D. Kan. 1975) (sole source of water); Bronson v.
Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (electricity).
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cess 10 2 and equal protection"°3 theories. On the surface, analyses
based on either theory appear to employ similar levels of judicial
scrutiny, analogous tests, and identical policy rationales. Never-
theless, there are significant distinctions between due process and
equal protection applications.
Due process analysis focuses on pretermination procedures
prior to the elimination of utility service." ° Equal protection
analysis, on the other hand, focuses on how pretermination proce-
dures affect the customer after termination. 0 5 The equal protec-
tion-due process dichotomy is exemplified by comparing Memphis
Light with Davis v. Weir,' °6 which was decided on equal protec-
tion grounds.
In Davis, a municipal utility terminated water service to a ten-
ant user whose landlord neglected to pay the utility bills.1 7 Since
the due process violation arising from termination without ade-
quate notice was not contested by the utility, the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the utility's refusal to restore service until the tenant made
the delinquent payment.0 8 The court found that holding tenants
responsible for the debts of the customer of record "divided those
who apply for utility service into two categories: applicants whose
contemplated service address is encumbered with a pre-existing
debt [for which they are not liable] and applicants whose resi-
dence lacks the stigma of such charges."'0 9 The court held that
this classification bore no rational relation to the legitimate gov-
102. 436 U.S. at 9-22.
103. See Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Koger v. Guarino, 412 F.
Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd mem. 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977) (utilizing both due
process and equal protection analyses).
The Davis court noted that the utility conceded that due process required pre-termina-
tion notice to the user, citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's
license without hearing violated procedural due process) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (procedural due process requires hearing before termination of welfare benefits).
497 F.2d at 143. While neither case involved utilities, Bell and Goldberg illustrate the
Supreme Court's concern that benefactors of a significant state-provided service receive a
pretermination hearing.
104. See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 12.
105. See Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974); Koger v. Guarino, 412 F. Supp.
1375 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of these
cases and the equal protection/due process distinction in the municipal utility service con-
text, see Note, Municoal Utility Service as a Property Right: Pre-Termination Notice to
Tenant Not Required- Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 885, 896-99
(1979) [hereinafter cited as DePaul Note].
106. 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. Id. at 141-42.
108. Id. at 173.
109. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
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eminent interest in supplying utility service: "The City has no
valid governmental interest in securing revenues from innocent
applicants who are forced to honor the obligations of another or
face constructive eviction from their homes ... ."1o
Due process analysis, unlike the rational basis test used in
equal protection analysis, involves balancing the government's in-
terest against "the risk of erroneous deprivation" of a protected
entitlement.II' The timing of the complaint against the utility de-
termines whether a due process or an equal protection inquiry is
most appropriate. When the user of municipally supplied utility
service is denied pretermination notice and opportunity to be
heard, due process treatment is appropriate. 2 Classifications
drawn by the utility after termination may be challenged on either
ground. 13  The appropriate analysis, however, depends not on
wooden applications of traditional due process or equal protection
concerns," 4 but on the common policy motivating these deci-
sions, " which goes beyond the need for equal treatment and ade-
quate notice. Quite simply, as the Supreme Court stated in
Memphis Light, "'A public utility should not be able to coerce a
customer to pay a disputed claim.' 116
2. P URFA
The only congressional act addressing consumer rights to util-
ity service is Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA).1 7 PURPA applies to both regulated and nonreg-
110. Id. at 145. Cf. Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1981). The Chatham
court read Davis as permitting termination of utility service to a landlord's residence be-
cause of delinquent payment for service to an apartment building he owned. Unlike the
tenant in Davis, the landlord had contracted for the utility service and benefited from its
improvement of his property.
111. See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 17.
112. Id. at 9-22. "This Court consistently has held that 'some kind of hearing is re-
quired at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests."' Id. at 16
(quoting Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)) (emphasis added).
113. See, eg., Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974); Bradford v. Edelstein, 467 F.
Supp. 1361 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
114. See DePaul Note, supra note 105, at 899 (criticizing Sterling v. Village of
Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979), for exaggerating
this analytical difference to reach a decision that "runs counter to the current trend of
public policy concerning the rights of utility users to receive notice prior to termination of
utility service.").
115. See supra notes 86, 99-103, 114 and accompanying text.
116. 436 U.S. at 10 (quoting Trigg v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 533 S.W.
2d 730, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975)).
117. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-45 (Supp. V 1981). See generaly Flax, supra note 65, at 21;
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ulated utilities which sell over 500 million kilowatt hours of power
a year. 1 8 The Act invites utilities to increase information to con-
sumers, 1 19 establishes standards for uniform termination of service
procedures, 120  and encourages the use of "lifeline rates."'12 1
PURPA gives consumers the right to intervene in utility proceed-
ings and requires that the utility compensate successful consumer
participants.1 22
Lifeline rates, typically defined as "rates for essential needs of
electric customers," allow a rate preference for elderly, disabled,
or low-income utility customers. 23 The primary purpose of life-
line rates is preventing service termination during the winter
months.24 Supporters of lifeline rates reason that since low-in-
come households use less power than higher income households,
the former spend a larger percentage of their income for electricity
and thus pay a higher average rate. 125 Moreover, rate increases
are felt more by low-income users than by wealthier users. 126 On
the other hand, lifeline rates are criticized as social engineering
that inhibits the utility's operating efficiency. 127  State commis-
Jones, The National EnergyAc and State Commission Regulation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
324 (1980); Journey, PURPA Rate Studies: Much Ado About Technical Analysis, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., July 16, 1981, at 23; Richardson, Why PURPA's Title I Should Be Repealed,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 12, 1981, at 13.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 2612 (Supp. V 1981).
119. Id. § 2625(f.
120. Id. § 2625(g).
121. Id. § 2624.
122. Id. §§ 2631-32; see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
123. See Investigation into Rate Structures of Elec. Util., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
409 (Or. P.U.C. 1980) (lifeline rates rejected because they impose inequitable and burden-
some effects on low-income customers). Lifeline rates are authorized by statute in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 460.6f (Supp. 1981), construed in Consumers Power Co., 25 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 167 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978) (rate relief to senior citizens not discrimi-
natory). Without statutory authorization, state commission establishment of lifeline rates
has been held to violate statutes forbidding rate discrimination. See Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n, 197 Colo. 56, 590 P.2d 495 (1979); see also Note,
Conservation, Lifeline Rates and Public Utility Regulatory Commissions, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 411 (1979) (lifeline rates violate New Mexico statutes).
124. See, e.g., Francfort & Woo, Lifeline and Incremental Cost Residential Electric
Rates, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 17, 1977, at 15; see also Frank, Lifeline Proposals and Eco-
nomic Efficiency Requirements, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 26, 1977, at 11 (lifeline rates can be
administered consistent with efficiency standards).
125. Francfort & Woo, supra note 124, at 15.
126. Id.
127. Flax, supra note 65, at 24; see also Lifeline Rates: An Update, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Aug. 13, 1981, at 48 (recent state treatment); The Lifeline Rate Issue, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Oct. 11, 1979, at 42 (analyzing conflicting state approaches). Since lifeline rates are avail-
able only to customers of regulated utilities, municipal utility customers are denied lifeline
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sions and municipalities are under no obligation to adopt the stan-
dards recommended by PURPA, but need only consider them.
128
PURPA only compels states to permit and compensate consumer
intervention. 12
9
Although PURPA indicates that Congress intended to en-
courage uniform and adequate utility service, the Act assures only
that consumer information and intervention opportunities will be
provided. Utility customers may thus find the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act 130 to be useful federal legislative protection. The
Act prohibits creditors from discriminating against credit appli-
cants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, mar-
ital status, age, and receipt of pubic assistance.' 3 1 Since Congress
did not exempt utilities from the Act, utility companies must com-
ply because they extend credit to residential customers.' 32 How-
ever, absent coverage by PURPA or the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, customer protection from overreaching utilities remains with
the states. And in states which prohibit their commissions from
intervening in municipal affairs, local governments provide the
only regulatory supervision of municipally owned utilities.
B. State Regulatory Treatment
While no two states regulate electric utilities identically, com-
mon characteristics permit categorization. State utility commis-
sion treatment of municipal electric companies falls into three
general classifications. The first includes states that exempt mu-
nicipal electric utilities from commission jurisdiction or allow
rate protection in jurisdictions which exempt municipal utilities from state commission
regulation.
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-23 (Supp. V 1981). Since Title I of PURPA does not mandate
compliance with its provisions, it has been criticized as "unnecessary, theoretically unat-
tainable and practically capricious." Richardson, supra note 117, at 13. Given the limited
power of the Act to require improved and uniform utility standards, Title I is more a policy
statement than a legislative mandate.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2631-32 (Supp. V 1981); see also Jones, supra note 117, at 330-32.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91f (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
131. See Donoghue, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Public Utilities, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., June 5, 1980, at 28 (except for three limited exemptions, see Equal Credit Opportu-
nity, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1983), public utilities are governed by the Act). The Act has influ-
enced state utility service regulations. In Pennsylvania, for example, regulated utilities
must comply with the Act's credit standards. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 7
(discussing origin of 52 PA. ADMiN. CODE §§ 56.01-56.99).
132. Donoghue, supra note 130, at 31. "What utilities must not do is rely on the erro-
neous assumption that the broad exemption from the Truth-in-Lending Act for public utili-
ties also exempts utilities from the Equal Credit Opportunity Act." Id.
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commission intervention only with the municipality's consent.133
The second includes states that regulate municipal utility opera-
tions beyond city borders. 134 The third includes states that regu-
late the service or rate components of municipally owned electric
companies or treat them like privately owned utilities.135
1. Total Exemption
Half of the states statutorily exempt all municipal electric util-
ity operations from commission jurisdiction. 36 The typical policy
behind exclusion is that "municipal utilities are presently effec-
tively regulated by the residents of the municipalities which own
and operate them. . .. ",13' Generally, the statutory scheme for
exemption involves limiting commission jurisdiction to "public
utilities" and then excluding municipally owned companies from
that definition. 138  Some states constitutionally prohibit "special
commissions," including state public utility commissions, from in-
terfering with the power of local governments to regulate munici-
pally owned electric companies. 39  Moreover, constitutional
133. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
136. The following states exempt all municipal utility operations: Alabama, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at Table
4.
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.01 (West Supp. 1981). But see Taylor v. Beltrami Elec.
Coop., 319 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1982) (municipal and cooperative electric companies must
comply with commmission service regulations).
138. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6 (West 1967) ("The Michigan public service
commission is hereby vested with complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all public
utilities in the state except any municipally owned utility."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
62-3(23)(d) (Supp. 1981) ("The term 'public utility'. . . shall not include a municipality.");
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.02 (Page Supp. 1981) (municipally operated corporations
excluded from definition of "public utility"); id. § 4905.03 (Page Supp. 1981) (municipally
operated corporations excluded from Public Utility Commission jurisdiction); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 49-34A- 1(12) (Supp. 1981) (commission jurisdiction extends to "public"
utilities; definition of public utility does not embrace "an electric or gas utility owned by a
municipality"); TEx. REv. Cwy. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 3(c) (Vernon 1980) ("The term
'public utility' or 'utility,' when used in this Act, includes any person, corporation, river
authority, cooperative corporation, or any combination thereof, other than a municipal
corporation.").
139. Eg., UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 28 ("The legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission... any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improve-
ment, money, property or effects... or to perform any municipal functions."); see Logan
City v. Public Util. Comm'n, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961 (1928) (constitution forbids state
legislature from delegating authority to commission to fix rates of municipal utility).
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home rule140 states may supervise their charter cities' electric utili-
ties 141 only by supplementing or superseding municipal regulation
with "general laws,"' 142  legislation uniformly applicable
statewide. 143
States immunizing municipally owned utilities from commis-
sion regulation usually adopt separate statutory guidelines for ex-
empted utilities. Ohio, for example, has enacted legislation
empowering municipal corporations to regulate their own utili-
ties;'" Michigan has adopted statutes governing city lighting.1
4 5
Some states allow a municipality to "avail itself of all the benefits
. . . of the regulatory services of the commission."' 146 Others pro-
vide that municipalities may seek the aid of the commission when
making single rate determinations without becoming subject to
commission jurisdiction in subsequent matters. 47
2. Service Beyond Municpal Boundaries
Many states allow their utility commissions to regulate only
municipal electric operations outside of the municipality's corpo-
rate limits. 148 The policy behind this restriction is to preserve lo-
140. Home rule denotes a grant of power by a state to its local governments to frame
and adopt a charter of government. Over half the states have adopted home rule provi-
sions; of these, half have done so by statute and the rest by direct constitutional grant of
legislative power to local governments. F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON
GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 302 (1970). Courts have construed constitutional home
rule provisions as restricting the state's power to areas of exclusive statewide concern and
areas of joint state and local concern. A state may not legislate in areas of exclusive local
concern; if it does, inconsistent local law prevails. Id. at 352-53. Courts, noting the extra-
territorial aspects of municipal utility operation, have placed them within the joint concern
area to permit state commission regulation. See, e.g., Vaubel, Of Concern to Paines-
ville-Or Only to the State: Home Rule in the Context of Utilities Regulation, 33 OHIO ST.
L.J. 257, 284, 328 (1972).
141. Vaubel, supra note 140, at 312.
142. See, e.g., OHIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3: "Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits
such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws."
143. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 140, at 336-37.
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 743.26 (Page 1976).
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 107.1-.10, 123.91-.101 (1967).
146. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-5 (1978).
147. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 743.45 (Page 1976).
148. Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming only
regulate municipal electric companies that operate beyond municipal boundaries. 1979
REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. In New Jersey, for example, "[e]very municipality in supplying
electricity, gas, steam or other products beyond its corporate limits is ... declared a public
utility." N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-24 (West 1967). The public utility commission has
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cal control while protecting the interests of consumers who exert
no influence in the city's political process. 49 The Wyoming Pub-
lic Service Commission, for example, has jurisdiction only over
municipal utility operations outside city boundaries and the sale
of excess electricity, 150 even though Wyoming has no municipally
owned electric utilities.' 5 ' Pennsylvania, on the other hand, re-
quires a certificate of public convenience and necessity for utility
service beyond a city's corporate limits.'
52
3. State Regulation of Municioal Electric Utilities
The final category includes states which subject all municipal
utility operations to commission jurisdiction. Notably, the states
most experienced in utility regulation-Wisconsin, New York and
Massachusetts-fall within this category, while those least exper-
ienced-Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas-exempt municipal
utilities from commission regulation.
53
The degree of permissible supervision varies from state to
state. Some commissions regulate only utility service or rates,
while others subject publicly owned utilities to the same standards
as investor-owned companies. Iowa, for example, authorizes com-
mission supervision solely over utility service. 54 In contrast, the
Indiana Public Service Commission has jurisdiction only over
ratemaking procedures: 55 municipal utility rates may be neither
excessive nor too low to permit "adequate and efficient service."1
56
New York,'57 Wisconsin,' 58 and Vermont'59 apply equal stan-
jurisdiction to regulate its "service, accounts, property rights, equipment, franchises, exten-
sions, reports, rates [and] issuance of bonds .... Id.
149. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 17, at 31.
150. WYo. STAT. § 37-1-101(a)(vi)(H) (1977).
151. 1979 REPORT, spra note 2, at 3-4.
152. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(5) (Purdon 1979).
153. Municipally owned electric utilities are regulated by utility commissions in Flor-
ida (only basic rate structure regulation), Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mon-
tana, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2.
154. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 476.1-2 (West Supp. 1983) ("The Iowa state commerce
commission shall regulate rates and services of public utilities.... Nothing in this para-
graph subjects the rates of municipal utilities to the regulatory authority of the commis-
sion." (emphasis added)).
155. IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1.5-3-8 (Bums 1982).
156. Id.
157. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 364 (McKinney 1974) (includes municipal electric service
as a public utility regulated within N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 64-74 (McKinney 1955 &
Supp. 1981)).
158. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.01 (West 1957) ("Public utility means and embraces every
corporation ... town, village or city that may own, operate, manage or control. . . any
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dards to municipally and investor-owned electric utilities. And in
Massachusetts, municipal power companies are included within
utility commission jurisdiction, although some provisions of its
public utilities laws apply selectively to private or municipal utili-
ties.160 State supervision has not, however, eliminated local input
into the regulatory process.1 6'
In states which regulate municipal utilities, policies supporting
the regulation of natural monopolies prevail over policies favoring
local autonomy. To determine the impact of this preference on
the electricity consumer, this Note next explores the problems cre-
ated by immunizing municipal utilities from state control.
III. PROBLEMS WITH IMMUNITY FROM STATE CONTROL
States exempting municipally owned utilities from utility com-
mission regulation view local government ownership as an ade-
quate substitute for state regulation to protect the public
interest.162 This rationale, however, is undercut by the practice of
the states most experienced in regulating municipally owned
power companies.163 The experienced states, which treat public
and private utilities alike, appear to have rejected the notion that
plant or equipment or any part of a plant or equipment, within the state, for... the
production, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light ... or power either directly
or indirectly to or for the public ....").
159. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2902 (1970). In discussing the "powers of municipali-
ties," the statute states:
[fln all such respects such municipality shall have the same privileges and be sub-
ject to the same restrictions as are provided for public service corporations ....
Such municipality may change, enlarge and extend the same from time to time
and maintain the same, having due regard for the safety and welfare of its citizens
and security of the public travel.
Vermont and Wisconsin are the only states which have compared the performances of
investor-owned and muncipally owned utilities. See infra notes 197-99, 209-10 and accom-
panying text.
160. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 34-69F, 129-32 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983)
(apply exclusively to municipal regulation); id. §§ 3-33A (apply exclusively to corporate
regulation). But see id. §§ 1-2, 69G-75A, 76-128 (West 1976) (both corporate and munici-
pal regulation).
161. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 75 (West 1976) (local aldermen to
regulate utility operations affecting "health, safety, convenience or property of the inhabit-
ants of their towns"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.58 (West 1957) (preserving a degree of con-
current jurisdiction).
162. See Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the
United States, 14 J.L. & EcON. 109 (1971). "Specifically, it is unlikely that the management
of a government firm will be permitted complete discretion in the setting of prices. Rather,
it will be constrained by formal pricing rules or by supervening organizations representing
other parts of the government." Id. at 121.
163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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local ownership protects local consumers. Other states, by regu-
lating service or rates, have recognized the municipality's inability
to maintain acceptable standards at least in those areas. 164
Municipally controlled utilities are vulnerable to three central
problems. The first is the failure to achieve necessary levels of
economic efficiency.1 65 The second is disruption caused by polit-
ical pressures,1 66 and the third is administrative inefficiency and
inadequacy.' 67 This Note contends that unregulated utilities are
more susceptible to these problems than regulated utilities.
A. Procedural Inadequacy
When a state exempts municipally owned utilities from com-
mission regulation, it puts the burden of regulation and compli-
ance on the utility itself. 68  City-owned utilities consequently
become self-policing industries. One serious problem with a self-
policing industry is that even where standards are predetermined
by the state, as in Ohio and Michigan, they are likely to be inter-
preted in the light most favorable to the utility. 69
Most municipally owned electric companies are found in small
or medium-sized communities 7 ° where local governing boards
lack the technical and administrative expertise of the state com-
missions.17 ' The lack of investigative powers and viable adminis-
trative structures hampers efficient handling of complaints and
164. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 11-12 (1979).
Although this treatise is primarily concerned with failures of regulation of privately owned
utilities, its observations apply equally where government ownership is substituted for
regulation.
166. Cf. id. at 11-12.
167. Id at 12-13.
168. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
169. M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at 71-78; see also Iowa Note, supra note 13, at 388-89
(local regulation in Iowa has failed, so state regulation recommended).
170. Three-fourths of all municipal electric systems are in communities of 10,000 or
less. See BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER, supra note 42, at 5.
171. While state utility commissions are concerned only with utilities, city governments
must address all facets of the city's operation. City officials not only lack the specialized
expertise of state utility commissioners, but also the funds with which to procure outside
technical advice. Consequently, they are often forced to rely on the utility's own manage-
ment for evaluation of its performance. The only detailed management study comparing
publicly and privately owned utilities found a lack of technical and managerial expertise
among Vermont's 22 smallest municipal power companies, and suggested that the largest
municipally owned company should "share its resources and experience with smaller mu-
nicipal utilities" throughout the state. VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD, IV MANAGE-
MENT AUDIT OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN VERMONT XI-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
VERMONT AUDIT] (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review); see supra note 17.
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enforcement of regulatory standards. t7 2 The prohibitive cost of
effective regulatory agencies at the local level 7 3 results in denial
of representation and intervention rights to most municipal utility
consumers. 1
74
In a study of compliance by Pennsylvania's privately owned
utilities with service and notice requirements, the state's Public
Utility Commission's Bureau of Consumer Services identified 806
instances where utilities misapplied commission regulations.
17
The study examined the efficacy of voluntary compliance with
regulations governing access to utility service, 176 termination of
service,117 and billing procedures. 178 The Bureau of Consumer
Services noted that the most frequent violations were committed
by the less efficient utilities, and that customer complaints pro-
vided accurate indicia of problems with the utility. 179 The Bureau
concluded that utilities often view regulations "as an obstruction
placed in the path of company management."' 8 °
The Pennsylvania study indicates that similar problems occur
with unregulated utilities, and are likely to go unremedied. A mu-
nicipal utility which views consumer service regulations as an ob-
struction is unlikely to protect the rights of consumers as zealously
as a disinterested state commission. Smaller utilities frequently
lack the manpower or resources to analyze and process consumer
172. See Iowa Note, supra note 13, at 388; see also M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at
71-78.
173. See Iowa Note, supra note 13, at 388.
174. Since many municipal utilities are too small to invoke PURPA jurisdiction, mu-
nicipal consumers are not guaranteed intervention rights. See supra note 118 and accom-
panying text.
175. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4 (evaluating utilities' implementation
of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission's Standards and Billing Practices for Resi-
dential Utility Service [codified at 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 56.1-.231 (Shepard's 1981)]).
The purpose of this chapter is to establish and enforce uniform, fair, and equita-
ble residential utility service standards governing eligibility criteria, credit and
deposit practices, and account billing, termination, and customer complaint pro-
cedures. The policy of this chapter is to assure adequate provision of residential
utility service, to restrict unreasonable termination of or refusal to provide that
service, and to provide functional alternatives to termination or refusal to provide
that service.
52 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 56.1 (Shepard's 1981).
176. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 7-11; see 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE
56.71-56.192 (Shepard's 1981).
177. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 13-37; see 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 56.11-56.65 (Shepard's 1981).
178. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 37-46; see 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE
56.11-56.65 (Shepard's 1981).
179. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-5; see infra note 195.
180. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 53.
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complaints."' 1 Where a municipal utility is unwilling or unable to
monitor service standards, it denies the residential customer the
minimum protections guaranteed to customers of regulated
utilities.
B. Political Susceptibility
One of the strongest policy arguments for exemption is that
freedom from state regulation allows municipally owned electric
companies to be responsive to local needs. 82 Nevertheless, leav-
ing municipal utilities under local control exposes them to greater
political pressures than utilities regulated by state commission.'83
Local politics often results in a government-run enterprise which
places the needs of special interest groups before those of the gen-
eral public.'8 4  As one commentator notes, "government-firm
management will use prices to confer benefits on voters in return
for effective political support for the enterprise and its manage-
ment." '85 Since "[tlhe government manager who tries to buy
political support through the price structure . . . cannot benefit
every voter," a manager must concentrate on benefiting customer
classes which will "extend the base of his political support."' 86 As
a result, local decisionmaking often is dictated by special interest
groups, which subverts the goal of regulation-furthering the pub-
lic interest. 8 7
An understanding of the impact of politics on a municipal util-
ity is essential to an evaluation of its pricing structures. Managers
of municipally owned electric companies usually take directions
from the mayor's office, city council, or a local utility commis-
sion.' 8 States which subject government-owned utilities to state
commission regulation recognize the deleterious impact of local
political pressures on municipal utility management. Wisconsin
supervises rates charged by municipal electric companies to pre-
181. See M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at 71-78; Iowa Note, supra note 13, at 388-89.
182. The city's governing body, acting in a political capacity, expresses the value
preferences to which the utility management must aspire. It becomes the pulse of
public approval. To a degree, then, the public gets the utility service it is willing
to demand, though it assumes the risk of mediocre performance should it fail to
insist upon responsible management of its utility enterprise.
Telly & Grove, supra note 11, at 285.
183. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 12.
184. Blair, supra note 17, at 31.
185. Peltzman, supra note 162, at 112 (footnotes omitted).
186. Id at 112-13.
187. See Blair, supra note 17, at 31; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 12.
188. Blair, supra note 17, at 31.
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vent the use of excessive charges to increase city revenues. 18 9 The
Indiana Legislature, on the other hand, has declared that "[r]ates
and charges too low to meet. . . requirements [of operation] are
unlawful."1 90 Politically motivated reluctance to increase rates is
as harmful to consumers as excessive charges. An insufficient rate
base inevitably jeopardizes quality of service, especially if infla-
tion makes utility operation more costly.191
C. Inefficient Operation
Municipally owned utilities are commonly defended for their
sensitivity to "social principles"' 192 and their relative impervious-
ness to the necessities of efficient operation which constrain inves-
tor-owned utilities.193 Municipal utilities often place greater
emphasis on social goals than on efficiency, and approach these
goals with more commitment than investor-owned utilities. 194
However, failure to pursue operational efficiency may endanger
local ownership, creating the threat of takeover by a large inves-
tor-owned utility less sensitive to local needs. To determine the
level of efficiency necessary for acceptable operation, and whether
regulation is required, two kinds of efficiencies-managerial and
economic-must be defined and distinguished.
1. Managerial Efficiency
Managerial efficiency measures management's competence in
utility operation, and is eventually reflected in service quality.
The Pennsylvania study indicates that less efficient utilities failed
to meet service standards more frequently than well-run
utilities. 195
189. See E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 575-76 (1950). See infra
note 216.
190. IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1.5-3-8 (Burns Supp. 1982).
Reluctance to increase rates is a problem unique to municipally owned utilities. The
Cleveland City Council, for example, did not grant the city-owned municipal light plant a
rate increase for over five and one-half years, despite high inflation and increasing costs.
Plain Dealer, Mar. 9, 1982, at 10-A, col. 4.
191. A. CARRON & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 14, at 6-14.
192. See J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION 109-20 (1961); Telly &
Grove, supra note 11, at 275-82.
193. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 13-20; Telly & Grove, supra note 11, at
282-84.
194. See BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER, supra note 42, at 12-13; Telly & Grove, supra
note 11, at 282-87.
195. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. The Bureau of Consumer Services
noted that consistent patterns of noncompliance with service regulations indicate problems
19831
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Government ownership does not guarantee efficient operation
of a utility, 96 especially if it shares funding, administration, and
technical personnel with other government departments so that it
has insufficient resources for self-policing. An audit by the Ver-
mont Public Service Board compared operating efficiency of all
publicly and privately owned utilities in Vermont and found that
the "smaller municipal utilities have been excessively fragmented
and insular, and their services and operations tend to be uneven in
quantity and quality. ... 197 The Vermont audit also noted that
the status of the state's largest municipal electric utility as a city
department impeded its financial planning.198 Vermont's jurisdic-
tion over municipal electric utilities enabled it to correct the budg-
eting deficiencies.' 99
Municipally owned utilities charge lower rates than investor-
owned utilities.2" The lower rates are made possible by advan-
tages unique to municipal utilities-exemption from income and
property taxes, availability of tax-exempt bond financing,20 and
access to cheaper fuels or wholesale electricity 2° 2-rather than by
efficient management. 0 3
The city's dual role as manager and regulator presents a seri-
in utility management. Some management shortcomings may prove equally damaging to
the utility and its customers. For example, the Bureau concluded that a routine analysis of
customer credit histories could have reduced "customer fraud or material misrepresenta-
tion." Id at 11. One Pennsylvania utility's practice of failing to screen termination notices
and place holds on accounts "reveal[ed] the possibility of ineffectual collection practices,"
and another utility's failure to adhere to stay procedures evidenced "a lack of coordination
between customer services and the collection department." Id at 22-23.
196. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 96-97.
197. VERMONT AUDIT, supra note 171, at XI-3.
198. Id at VIII-6, 7. The Vermont Public Service Board also found the utility's budg-
eting performance unacceptable by industry standards. Id at 6.
199. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2902 (1970).
200. BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER, supra note 42, at 8; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 223;
see also A. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 575.
201. Richardson, On Government Takeovers of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Nov. 4, 1976, at 19, 21, 24.
202. See Niagara Power Project, Pub. L. No. 85-159, 71 Stat. 401 (1957) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 836(a)(1) (1976)) (giving power purchasing preference to public bodies and non-
profit cooperatives in half the power generated by Niagara facility).
203. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 192, at 405-06; M. GLAESER, supra note 37, at 582; R.
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 94; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 223; Peltzman, supra note
162, at 135-36; Richardson, supra note 201, at 19.
There are "marked differences between the bigh taxes imposed upon the private utilities
of this country and the relative freedom from taxes or tax equivalents enjoyed by the elec-
tric plants operating under Federal, state or local ownership. [This] tax situation [makes
difficult] any fair comparison between private-plant and public-plant performance." J.
BONBRIGHT, supra note 192, at 405. This tax advantage has been labeled illusory because
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ous managerial dilemma from the consumer's perspective.2 °4 The
city as management is expected to remain impartial, yet it repre-
sents potential adversaries-the utility and its customers. Thus,
the city as regulator has less incentive to apply the level of scru-
tiny of a disinterested state commission. When political pressure
is added, the city's conflicting roles are further unbalanced.
2. Economic Efficiency
To provide public benefits consistently, a utility's operation
and management should reflect externalities.20 5  Additional cus-
tomer service costs arising from inadequate service by inefficient
utilities exemplify an externality: the customer bears a cost which
rightfully should be borne by the utility. State supervision of serv-
ice by investor-owned utilities indicates that legislators believe
utilities should bear the costs of their own inefficiencies. Exempt-
ing municipally owned utilities from state regulation should not
be construed as legislative intent to excuse them from inter-
"[a]ny 'savings' [to the public].. . would still have to be recouped by imposing higher...
taxes on utility customers and other property owners." Richardson, supra note 201, at 22.
204. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 88:
[M]anagers of government enterprises, along with their controllers, are expected
to serve as the agents of both equity capital and of buyers. This dual role is
clearest in the case of those with oversight responsibilities, and it stems at least in
part from their association with the equity-holding government... . [I]n the ab-
sence of effective control, the management of public corporations is called upon
to be both "actor and judge." If one accepts the controller-manager dichotomy, at
least in the abstract, it becomes clear that at least some of the questions that one
might ask about regulated industries can also be asked about government enter-
prises. One might wonder, for instance, what goals controllers and managers are
likely to pursue, and what the performance implications of alternative control.
structures are.
205. See Samuels, supra note 14, at 358-59. "Externalities" are costs or benefits which
are not reflected in the price of a good or service. In this Note, "externality" refers to
external costs imposed by one economic actor upon another, without inclusion by the for-
mer in his operating calculations. These external costs pose potential problems:
If [external costs are]. . . included in a utility's rates, the rates will generate reve-
nues in excess of a reasonable revenue requirement. If external costs are ignored,
a misallocation of resources will result because the full cost to society is not re-
flected in the price, and consequently, more energy is consumed than would be
otherwise.
Note, Reform of Electricity Pricing in the United States, 25 BUFFALO L. REy. 183, 200
(1975) (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
An Environmental Protection Agency study of Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia determined that "[s]tricter environmental controls on electric power
plants could prevent 54,000 pollution-related deaths and avert billions of dollars in crop
losses in the Ohio River Valley by the year 2000." N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1981, at A-12, col.
1. The environmental damage to farmers and other individuals residing outside the util-
ity's service area represents an external cost of electricity production which should right-
fully be borne by the producer as pollution control expenses.
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nalizing service costs; rather, it may evidence a naive belief
by legislators that municipalities will adequately account for
externalities.
Municipal utilities assert that they are well-equipped to inter-
nalize social externalities, 20 6 since they are generally nonprofit. 20 7
Yet municipally owned utilities often have difficulty meeting op-
erating costs because they are relatively small and run at less than
optimal economies of scale 208-factors which reduce their overall
efficiency. The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin analyzed
the operations of municipally owned electric companies and
found that "operating revenue and expense ratios vary inversely
with plant size."209 This analysis also noted that large utilities
have lower expense ratios than smaller utilities.210 The Vermont
Public Service Board found similar characteristics in its smaller
municipal utilities.2 ' Without commission supervision to ensure
that municipal utilities charge rates sufficient to cover costs and
maintain service quality, customers are likely to bear the costs of
inefficiency.
Because state regulatory bodies confront the same procedural,
206. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 192, at 109-20 (discussing social principles of
ratemaking); Telly & Grove, supra note 11, at 276; see generally R. SCHMALENSEE, supra
note 165, at 19 (social goals are best served by pursuing economic efficiency). Charging
lower rates to charitable institutions is one "social principle of ratemaking" sometimes used
by municipal electric utilities. J. BONBRiGHT, supra note 192, at 111.
207. Supporters of city ownership contend that municipal utilities are accountable to
the local public rather than to shareholders. See, e.g., BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER, supra
note 42. The lack of accountability to shareholders, however, may encourage self-defeating
strategies such as lowering rates below cost needs, which could thwart social goals or dis-
rupt managerial efficiency. See Richardson, supra note 201, at 25.
208. Economies of scale cause long-run average costs to decline as output is increased.
Since electric utilities are natural monopolies, direct competition creates diseconomies
which appear as ruinous competition and unnecessary duplication of resources. Optimal
economies of scale in such a market are reached by large scale producers which benefit
from declining average production costs. Average production costs generally bear an in-
verse relationship to utility size. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 192, at 11-17; R.
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 165, at 3-5.
While one commentator assumes that tax advantages, freedom from regulation, and
superior management ensure more efficient operation of municipal utilities, see Neuberg,
supra note 3, at 320-21, another asserts that municpal utilities are inherently less efficient
because of size, political impact, and the absence (in most cases) of the profit motive that
characterizes investor-owned utilities, see Peltzman, supra note 162, at 145-46.
209. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN, ANALYSIS OF 1980 OPERA-
TIONS-MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN WISCONSIN ii (1981) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review).
210. Id at ii-iii. Distribution expenses are raised by a greater concentration of custom-
ers per mile. Id.
211. VERMONT AUDIT, supra note 171,passim.
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political, and efficiency problems in the context of regulating pri-
vate utilities, they have the expertise to treat these problems in the
context of municipal utility regulation. State regulation ensures
utility compliance with and accountability for service standards,
obviating court intervention to impose procedural fairness.
212
State commission regulation offers greater objectivity than munic-
ipal supervision by virtue of its relative insulation from local poli-
tics and interest groups. 213 Local control tends to place political
expediency above the public interest. As one commentator ob-
served, "The more numerous consumers were not found to be
consistently favored by government-owned utilities. 21 4
In terms of managerial efficiency, public utility commissions
provide objective decisionmaking, in contrast to the often self-
serving decisionmaking by city-owned and regulated utilities.
State commissions recommend improvements, as in Vermont;21
5
protect consumers from overcharges, as in Wisconsin;216 and po-
lice for rates set too low to provide adequate service, as in
Indiana.217
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems arising from exempting municipal electric utili-
ties from state commission supervision 218 suggest that regulation
would better serve the public interest. State commission regula-
tion offers consumers more coherent, meaningful complaint and
service procedures,219 and holds municipal utilities accountable
for minimum service standards. 220 Nor are state proceedings as
susceptible to conflicts of interest and political manipulation.221
212. See, e.g.,MemphisLight, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); supra notes 99-116 and accompanying
text.
213. Peltzman, supra note 162, at 145; see supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
214. Peltzman, supra note 162, at 145.
215. See supra note 171.
216. Municipally owned utilities were brought within commission jurisdiction in Wis-
consin to prevent them from charging excessive rates to enhance city revenues. See E.
CLEMENS, supra note 189, at 575-76; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.01 (West Supp. 1982).
217. IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1.5-3-8 (Bums Supp. 1982).
218. See supra notes 162-217 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
220. The PENNSYLVANIA REPoRT, supra note 15, at 13, indicates that prior to the estab-
lishment of service standards for regulated utilities, service was often terminated in a "cal-
lous and cavalier fashion," usually with little or no notice. Although the Report addressed
only investor-owned utilities, unregulated municipal utilities show similar disregard for
procedural fairness, as indicated by the facts of Memphis Light. See supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
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Commission ratemaking procedures protect consumers from over-
charge222 and permit municipally owned utilities to earn adequate
revenues.
223
States which regulate municipal utility rates have decided that
commission supervision better protects the public interest than lo-
cal self-determination. Wisconsin initiated commission regulation
of municipal utilities to protect customers from excessive pricing
by city government. 224 Regulation in Indiana ensures that timid
municipal governments will not provide inadequate funding for
utility operations.225 A Vermont audit offered insightful sugges-
tions as to how the state's municipal utilities could improve opera-
tions.226 Adopting innovative ratemaking procedures which
minimize regulatory lag22 7 has increased the profitability of mu-
nicipal utilities in New Mexico.228
The decision to regulate municipally owned utilities requires
weighing the policies supporting regulation against the traditional
justifications for exemption. In short, natural monopolies are reg-
ulated in the public interest to protect consumers in a captive mar-
ket;229 exemption is supported by the belief that government
ownership preserves local autonomy and effectively substitutes for
regulation.230  Because the utility industry is constantly changing,
legislatures must frequently balance these competing policies and
decide which approach best serves the needs of their citizens. In-
222. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
223. See Peltzman, supra note 162, at 109; Richardson, supra note 201, at 26; supra
notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
226. VERMONT AUDIT, supra note 171,passim.
227. Regulatory lag occurs when "constraints of government management by operating
rules introduce lags in the response of government firm prices to their economic determi-
nants .... " Peltzman, supra note 162, at 140. New ratemaking techniques reduce the
effect of the lag between requests for and receipt of new rates. See Catalano, Customer
Costs, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 59.
228. New Mexico adopted rate price indexing for municipally owned as well as pri-
vately owned utilities. Price indexing
provides for automatic, quarterly adjustments in base service rates in response to
net increases and decreases in the company's actual book costs for furnishing
jurisdictional service. It is hoped and anticipated that the method will promote
incentives to serve the public and achieve equality between unit service rates and
unit service costs and, thus, the conditions which competition in the furnishing of
such services would achieve if permitted to do so.
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 113, 136-37 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Cornm'n,
1975) (emphasis in original).
229. See supra notes 25, 29-30.
230. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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clusion of municipally owned electric utilities in state public util-
ity commission jurisdiction provides a practical solution to
procedural inadequacies,2 3 ' political disruption,232 and
inefficiency.233
PAUL A. MEYER
231. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text.
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